The Accusation: That the Shaykh Says, “Action Is a Condition for the Completeness of Faith”

Strangely, one person wrote in defence of the Shaykh, but when he reached this expression he was perplexed by it and called it “a serious slip and a great stumble,” not realising that this came from his own ignorance. For his own shaykh, whom he venerates, repeats it day and night and reinforces its false meaning by saying “that the one who abandons the genus of action is not a disbeliever” — yet we never heard him say of his shaykh that he had agreed with the Murjiʾah.

The truth is that although the Shaykh frequently states in his speech and in his books, “Action is a condition for the completeness of faith, not a condition for its validity,” one of the remarkable things is that he attributes whoever holds the opposite to the school of the Khawārij. His accusers ignore this attribution because it exposes the falsity of their claim and shows their error in the false accusation they made against the Shaykh, as will be explained.

In some places the Shaykh stated that the action of the heart is a condition of validity, while what is besides it is a condition of completeness (as in the tape of a meeting with al-ʿAnbarī). In another place he said: “The action of the heart is an essential part of faith, and the action of the limbs is not an essential part” (see his explanation of Al-Adab al-Mufrad, tape (6)). This means that it is part of faith, and in it is a reply to the one who was obstinate and said: “The Shaykh excludes action from faith,” relying on the definition of a condition (sharṭ) as that which lies outside the essence, and so accused the Shaykh of not counting action as part of faith. We have already seen many quotations proving that the Shaykh counts action as part of faith, and with this last detail he affirmed that the action of the limbs is part of faith.

Accordingly, the statement of whoever said, “Action, according to Ahl al-Sunnah, is a condition for the completeness of faith,” means that what departs from a person is the obligatory completeness of faith when he abandons some of the obligatory actions, as in the Prophet’s ﷺ saying: “The fornicator does not commit fornication while he is a believer.” Shaykh al-Islām said: “What is negated here is the completeness of faith” — but it is the obligatory completeness, not the recommended one; so he is called a believer deficient in faith. Al-Qāsim ibn Sallām said: “What is negated is the reality of faith,” and the meaning is the same. As for the Khawārij, they said: “All of faith departs from him,” meaning that if he abandons any obligatory action he leaves Islam for disbelief. The Muʿtazilah said: “He is in a station between the two stations.” So it is said that they made action a condition for the validity of faith, such that if part of it departs, all of it departs. Ahl al-Sunnah, however, do not say that if part of it departs, all of it departs; rather, what they negate is the completeness of faith — except prayer, concerning which there is disagreement among the later scholars.

The fair-minded will know from the foregoing that the Shaykh did not mean the abandonment of all actions, because he made clear that whoever differs with him is upon the school of the Khawārij, who declare disbelief for abandoning individual actions. If the expression is taken to mean partial abandonment (muṭlaq al-tark) — which is what the Shaykh meant, not the abandonment of all action — then the cause of the difficulty for some of those who rejected the soundness of the expression “action is a condition of completeness, not a condition of validity, in faith” is that a condition, according to the scholars of legal theory, is that which lies outside the essence. This would imply that the one who says it does not make action part of faith, and so he would be like the Murjiʾah, who excluded action from faith and made it one of its fruits.

So we say: as long as the one who uses the expression does not exclude action — whether of the heart or of the limbs — from faith, there is no objection to terminology. The word “condition” has occurred in the words of some scholars who did not mean by it that action is excluded; among them is what occurs in the words of Ibn al-Qayyim in Kitāb al-Ṣalāh, so refer to it.

Our shaykh Ibn Bāz, in an answer to a question, says: “The action of the heart is a condition for the validity of faith; as for the action of the limbs, some of it is a condition of validity and some a condition of completeness.” If you reflect, you will find no difference between the expressions of the two shaykhs, once you take into account that one of them declares disbelief for abandoning prayer and the other does not. Both shaykhs meant by abandonment here “partial abandonment” (muṭlaq al-tark), not “absolute abandonment” (al-tark al-muṭlaq) — that is, abandoning individual actions, not abandoning action entirely, which is what is expressed as abandoning the genus of action. This latter case Shaykh al-Albānī considered a hypothetical one, and that is why he attributed the one who differed with him to the school of the Khawārij, because they declare disbelief for abandoning individual actions, as we saw in the words of Shaykh al-Islām.

Those who took the expression to mean “absolute abandonment” imagined a case in which the legally responsible person claims faith while never having done any action at all — or, in other words, “never did any good at all.” So they objected to whoever said that action is a condition of completeness, because one in such a situation cannot possibly be a believer; that is, they understood that it entails the absence of the genus of action while faith remains. They are right in saying “he cannot possibly be a believer” if by action is meant the genus of action. But when the Shaykh says that action is a condition of completeness, he at the same time denies that a believing servant could be conceived who never performed any action at all. The Shaykh does not permit this, because of what he believes regarding the interconnection between the inward and the outward. We came to know this through experience of his words — may Allah have mercy on him — and we have already seen some evidence of it.

Reflect on his words about executing the one who abandons prayer in his book Ḥukm Tārik al-Ṣalāh (p. 62): “If he prefers being killed to praying, this shows that his abandonment was out of denial, and so he dies in this state as a disbeliever, as was mentioned from Ibn Taymiyyah.” See also his words in (Al-Ṣaḥīḥah 1/41). Among them is his saying: “In these two hadiths there is clear evidence of a matter that many people do not know, even though it has become known in psychology: that corruption of the outward affects the corruption of the inward, and vice versa. There are many hadiths with this meaning, which we may undertake to collect and document on another occasion, if Allah the Exalted wills.” End quote (Al-Silsilah al-Ṣaḥīḥah 1/74).

He also said: “The truth is that the soundness of the heart cannot be conceived except with the soundness of deeds, and there is no soundness of deeds except with the soundness of hearts. The Messenger of Allah ﷺ explained this in the finest manner in the hadith of al-Nuʿmān ibn Bashīr: ‘Indeed, in the body there is a morsel of flesh; if it is sound, the whole body is sound, and if it is corrupt, the whole body is corrupt. Indeed, it is the heart’; and in his other hadith: ‘You will straighten your rows, or Allah will cause differences between your faces’ — that is, your hearts; and his ﷺ saying: ‘Allah is beautiful and loves beauty,’ which concerns lawful material beauty, contrary to what many think.” End quote (introduction to his verification of Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn, p. 15).

This scenario that some have posited is one of positing what does not occur, as Shaykh al-Islām said: “Because this is positing what does not occur. It is impossible for a man to do nothing of what he was commanded — prayer, zakāh, fasting and Hajj — and to do whatever prohibited acts he is able to, such as praying without wuḍūʾ and facing other than the qiblah, and marrying his mothers, while still being a believer inwardly. Rather, he does that only because of the absence of faith in his heart” (see Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā 7/218).

With this, the error of whoever said that action is a condition for the completeness of faith becomes clear — if he meant by it the genus of action. Otherwise, no one declares disbelief for abandoning individual actions except the Khawārij, apart from prayer. As for whoever said that this is the view of the Murjiʾah, that is with regard to the root of the matter, because this term is newly introduced; some intended by it to distinguish between the school of Ahl al-Sunnah and that of the Khawārij, and others understood it other than as intended.¹

Because of the importance of this issue, and because it is the source of the disagreement between the Shaykh and his opponents, I will devote a separate chapter to it. But we should bear in mind that the Shaykh says the action of the limbs is a condition of completeness, meaning individual actions — that is, “action in part” (muṭlaq al-ʿamal), not “action in its entirety” (al-ʿamal al-muṭlaq), as we have seen — meaning that he does not declare disbelief for abandoning individual actions. Those of Ahl al-Sunnah who differ with him hold the same view, except that they make an exception for prayer. This is the summary of the disagreement between the Shaykh and the scholars who differed with him. As for some of those affiliated with the Shaykh, such as Shaykh al-Ḥalabī and Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan al-Miṣrī in his series on the issues of faith, they differ from the Shaykh and from the school of Ahl al-Sunnah on this issue. We ask Allah for well-being.

For further clarification I say: what appears to me is that the position of Shaykh al-Albānī — may Allah have mercy on him — on this issue is that he does not make it a general rule as the Murjiʾah do. He does not say: “Everyone who says lā ilāha illā Allāh sincerely from his heart is saved, even if he does not perform any of the obligations.”² Rather, he says that lā ilāha illā Allāh saves the one who says it from eternity in the Fire if he says it sincerely from his heart and dies upon it, even if he committed major sins and even if he abandoned the obligations (see Al-Silsilah al-Ṣaḥīḥah 1314). So he restricts the matter to dying upon it at the time of death, as in the hadith of the card (al-biṭāqah), and as reported in the two Ṣaḥīḥs: Abū Dharr — may Allah be pleased with him — said: I came to the Prophet ﷺ while he was wearing a white garment and was asleep; then I came to him when he had woken, and he said: “There is no servant who says lā ilāha illā Allāh and then dies upon that except that he enters Paradise” (in one narration: “or does not enter the Fire”). I said: Even if he commits fornication and even if he steals? He said: “Even if he commits fornication and even if he steals.” I said: Even if he commits fornication and even if he steals? He said: “Even if he commits fornication and even if he steals.” I said: Even if he commits fornication and even if he steals? He said: “Even if he commits fornication and even if he steals, despite Abū Dharr.” Whenever Abū Dharr narrated this, he would say: “even if Abū Dharr dislikes it.” Abū ʿAbdullāh (al-Bukhārī) said: “This is at the time of death or before it, if he repents, regrets and says lā ilāha illā Allāh; he is forgiven.”

This is indicated by his words in the explanation of Al-Adab al-Mufrad, tape no. (6): “So faith accepts increase and decrease. The Muslim, as he lives in this life, should keep this fact before his eyes: that faith is subject to increase and decrease, and what is subject to decrease is subject to complete non-existence.” See also the words of the scholars, among them the imams of the Daʿwah, in explaining the hadith of the card.

This statement of his agrees completely with what is established from a group of the Salaf, such as al-Awzāʿī, Ibn ʿUyaynah and al-Barbahārī, who said: “Faith is speech and action; it increases and decreases until nothing of it remains.” Whoever says this has freed himself from irjāʾ entirely.³

With this restriction — his saying “that he dies upon it” — it becomes clear to the reflective reader that there is no benefit in debating this issue with one known to oppose the Murjiʾah in their view that faith neither increases nor decreases and that actions are not part of faith. Indeed, the Shaykh is among the best known of those who pointed out that the disagreement between Ahl al-Sunnah and the Murjiʾah of the jurists is real, after people had for a long time thought it merely verbal. And since abandoning the obligations, according to those who do not declare disbelief for abandoning prayer, is not outward disbelief but rather an indication of inward disbelief: if the one who differs acknowledges the connection between the outward and the inward — and the Shaykh acknowledges it, as we just saw — he must concede that one who abandons the obligations while living among the Muslims shows clear evidence of the disbelief he conceals in his heart. But the Shaykh does not apply this ruling to the specific individual, because he says that this may not hold true in the case of a particular person, whose life may end with it (the testimony), and it will then benefit him if he said it sincerely from his heart. And the Shaykh — as we have seen — establishes most of his rulings with regard to the specific individual, not in general; he would often say, “We want to deal with the reality.”

But we say: whoever reflects on the state of many sinners, especially those who abandon the obligations, will find that they do not die upon the testimony; on the contrary, they are prompted to say the testimony and utter instead other, forbidden words. It should also be noted that the Shaykh — may Allah have mercy on him — applies his view to those who lived in societies where the call to true Islam was absent and the call to Westernisation and to distracting people with worldly life was active. In such settings there are Muslims far from adherence to Allah’s religion: one of them utters the two testimonies and has not committed a nullifier, but Westernisation has used its weapons against them and rallied against them its cavalry and infantry, until one of them hardly practises anything of Allah’s religion — while still acknowledging that they are wrong and in danger, yet drowning in desires, pleasures and amusements.

So we say: there is no agreement between this view and the school of the Murjiʾah. The Murjiʾah do not make action part of faith, and say that the servant is complete in faith even if he does not perform the obligations. As for the Hereafter, (they say) it is not known what Allah will do with them: He may punish all of them, pardon all of them, or punish some and pardon some — except that He will not leave any of them in the Fire forever. They allowed that some of them may be joined to those whose good deeds outweigh their bad deeds, and even that one may be raised above him in rank. So in their view they are left entirely to the Will, and it is not known what Allah will do with them; rather, their matter is deferred (yurjaʾ) to Allah and His judgement… They allow that none of the people of tawḥīd may enter the Fire, which contradicts what is known by mass-transmission (tawātur) from the texts of the Sunnah: that some of the people of major sins will enter the Fire and then come out of it through intercession. With this mass-transmission, which cannot be rejected, it may not be said that it is possible that none of them enters the Fire; rather, some of them must enter it, and those are the ones whose scales are light and whose bad deeds outweigh, as the Companions said — and Abū Muḥammad ibn Ḥazm related this as a consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah… So the matter is not a cause beyond order and wisdom; rather, it is tied to causes, and the ruling is arranged upon it in the most perfect arrangement, proceeding according to a system required by the cause and called for by the wisdom (see Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn 385).

If you reflect, you will realise that most of the disagreement between the Shaykh, the imam, and some of his opponents concerns “the impediments to declaring disbelief,” even if some of them overlooked this or chose to overlook it. I say “some of them,” for I am certain that many of them did not know the school of the Murjiʾah, let alone the school of Ahl al-Sunnah; rather, each is a blind follower carried along by his desires, grazing with those who graze.

What the texts and narrations indicate, and what we hold to be correct, is that abandoning the obligations entails the departure of faith; indeed, persisting in abandoning prayer alone entirely entails the departure of faith and the judgement that the one who abandons it is a disbeliever who will abide in the Fire forever — and we seek refuge in Allah. This will be set out precisely in another place.

When I came across Shaykh al-Albānī’s comments on Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ by al-Ḥawālī — who founded this book of his on attacking the Salafi call as represented by its undisputed reviver, Imam Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, may Allah have mercy on him — I became even more certain that the Shaykh is on the right path in this issue, that is, the issue of the genus of action. The difficulty arose for those who differed with him only because they did not understand the Shaykh’s way of discussing these issues, many aspects of which have little practical bearing.

The Shaykh — may Allah have mercy on him — does not discuss the case of a complete absence of action together with uttering the two testimonies, which, as Shaykh al-Islām said, is a hypothetical case, as we have seen. Meanwhile, we find some who delved into it, seeking to prove that the one who abandons action entirely is not a disbeliever, until he declared that the two testimonies save the one who says them from eternity in the Fire without any action of the limbs, even if he abandoned all the obligations and committed all the prohibitions except major shirk. His view on this issue contradicts the consensus, as we have seen.

Those who falsely affiliate themselves with the Shaykh reached the point of building their call in non-Arab lands upon this false particular concerning (the genus of action). If a non-Arab who wants to enter Islam cannot bear to perform the obligations and to stop the prohibitions in which he is immersed, they tell him: “It is enough for you to utter the two testimonies, even if you do not perform any of the obligations and even if you do not abandon the prohibitions!”

Their reliance in this misguidance is not al-Albānī — far be it from him to accept this — but rather those who laid down the principles of the issue for them, such as al-Ḥalabī and al-Zahrānī, in numerous works on this issue in particular. They have contradicted the consensus of the scholars of this age, indeed the consensus of the early scholars.